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The After Tax Rate of Return
Affects Private Savings
ABSTRACT
This paper reviews theoretical argurrents and empirical
evidence regarding the interest elasticity of savings. It
concludes that there are strong theoretical reasons to expect
an increase in after tax rates of return to increase private
savings. Moreover, the empirical rrethods used in imst previous
studies are likely to produce underestimates of the interest
elasticity of savings. New evidence based on direct estimation
of utility function paraneters suggests that savings are likely
to be highly interest elastic. The paper concludes by noting
that too little tirre has passed to evaluate the effects of the




617-495—2447The effects of the rate of return on the level of savings and the
rate of capital formation are of central concern to both economists and
policymakers. Although the welfare effects of tax reforms do not directly
depend on their impact on savings, the effects of taxes on savings is crucial
to considerations of tax incidence and equity and to the issue of long run
growth. The impact of the rate of return on consumption and savings decisions
also bears on questions regarding the appropriate government discount rate,
the short run crowding out effects of fiscal policy, and the effects of
public indebtedness on capital intensity.
The traditional view among economists is that changes in the rate of
return are likely to have only a small effect on the savings rate. This
consensus is supported by theoretical arguments pointing to the opposing income
and substitution effects associated with changes in the rate of return. The
ambiguous implications of theory are matched by empirical studies which yield
conflicting estimates as to the size of the impact of changes in the rate of
return. The polar empirical estimate is Michael Boskin's (1978) suggestion
that the interest elasticity of savings is .4. This estimate is widely regarded
as too high.
This paper re—examines the theoretical arguments and reviews new
empirical evidence regarding the interest elasticity of savings. Both the
theoretical analysis and the empirical work demonstrate the strong likelihood
that increases in the real after—tax rate of return received by savers would
lead to substantial increases in long run capital accumulation. While it is
not possible to quantify the impact with any precision, it seems reasonable
to believe that a shift towards expenditure taxation would lead to signifi-
cant increases in the private savings rate.I argue that the failure of—2—
traditional empirical approaches to isolate significant rate of return effects
is a consequence of their failure to distinguish between transitory and per—
manent changes in the rate of return, and of other specification errors.
The theoretical analysis emphasizes the importance of recognizing
heterogeneity among savers in examining the effects of tax changes which raise
the rate of return available to savers. It begins by demonstrating that even
if all savings decisions are determined by rule of thumb, savings are likely
to be elastic with respect to the rate of return, as long as the rules of
thumb differ persistently across households. The effects of changes in the
rate of return on savings are then considered in a realistic multi—period life—
cycle framework. Within such a framework, the importance of recognizing future
labor income in analyzing savings is stressed. It is shown that for a wide
range of utility function parameters, the interest elasticity of savings is
likely to be positive. Since recent research suggests the importance of bequests
in determining aggregate capital formation, models of intergenerational transfers
are also considered. It is shown that as long as any part of the economy is
comprised of households with operative intergenerational transfer motives the
long run impact is also likely to be substantial. While the sign of the
response of savings to a change in the interest rate cannot be determined
unambiguously from theoretical considerations, consideration of several models
leads to a presumption in favor of a positive response.
Section I discusses theoretical approaches to the linkage between
savings and the rate of return. Section II critiques the traditional consump-
tion function approach to examining rate of return effects on savings behavior,
and reviews estimates obtained using alternative new methodologies. Section
III concludes the paper by discussing the implications of the results for
current economic policy discussion.—3—
I. Theoretical Considerations
In a closed economy, it is not possible to imagine how the rate of.
return to savers could change without other relevant economic variables also
changing. Thus, it is necessary to be clear about the nature of the shock
causing the rate of return to change. Discussions of the "interest elasticity
of savings" are apt to be misleading since the change in savings associated
with any given change in the rate of return to savers will depend on what
caused the rate of return to change. The analysis here focuses on the effects
of tax policies which alter the rate of return available to savers. Any tax
change will affect revenue collections and so must be associated with
changes in either government spending, public borrowing or other tax collections.
The analysis here is all based on a differential incidence approach, where it
is assumed that spending and total revenue collections remain constant so that
changes in capital income taxes are offset by adjustments to payroll or con—
sumption taxes. All the discussion is, therefore, about compensated effects.
An effort is made to maintain this distinction in drawing implications from
the empirical work in the discussion below)'
The discussion here focuses on the "partial equilibrium effects" of a
change in the rate of return. It is assumed that factor prices are unaffected
by changes in the savings rate. Thus the analysis addresses the supply of
savings schedule rather than the reduced form relationship between tax changes
and capital intensity. In the special cases of a small open economy or a
production function with an infinite elasticity of substitution, the assumption
of constant factor prices will be valid. Otherwise, it would be necessary
to consider the aggregate production function in assessing the ultimate effect
of a change in tax policy on private savings.—4—
Rule of Thumb Savings
Economic theory needs to simplify reality enormously if anything
tractable is to result. But it is important to acknowledge at the outset that
no single analytic model can capture the complex motivations for any one
individual's savings decisions let alone the savings decisions of the entire
population. It turns out the existence of substantial diversity in savings
behavior, creates a presumption in favor of a positive savings response to
increases in the rate of return.
Consider a population made up of "rule of thumb savers" each of whom
saves regardless of the rate of return a fixed fraction of his total disposable
income. The "rule of thumb" rate of saving varies across individuals; some
are liquidity constrained and consume everything, others may have a quite high
marginal propensity to save. Now imagine a reduction in the tax rate on capital
income, financed by an equal revenue yield increase in labor income tax rate.
Such a measure would, assuming some persistence in savings propensities,
redistribute income from persons with low to persons with high savings propen-
sities. As a consequence national savings would increase, even though no
individual's savings incentive was affected. As time passes, the savings rate
will rise further, as the share of total income going to persons with high
savings propensities increases.
Life Cycle Savings
Perhaps the dominant theoretical model used by economists in analyzing
long run questions relating to savings behavior is the life—cycle hypothesis
of Franco Modigliani. In an earlier paper, Summers (1981), I argued that
realistic formulations of the life—cycle hypothesis implied a very substantial
long run response of capital accumulation to tax measures that change after tax—5—
rates of return. The essential reason for the responsiveness of savings was
the "human wealth" effect associated with changes in the after tax rate of
return. Increases in the after tax rate of return reduce human wealth defined
as the present value of individuals' labor income claims. This effect is
absent in the two period textbook formulations with all income received in
the first period.
The claims put forward in Summers (1981) about the high interest
elasticity of avings have been challenged by Evans (1983) and Starrett (1982)
who argue that they do not survive generalization of the model. Evans'
principal point is that if one assumes a significantly negative time preference
rate and a very low intertemporal elasticity of substitution, a relatively
small interest elasticity of substitution will result. His rhetoric seems
rather overblown given that the elasticity is positive in every case he
considers, and greater than .4 in most cases. Moreover, empirical evidence
casts doubt on the relevance of the parameter values underlying Evans' low
elasticity cases. Starrett (1982) shows that lower elasticities of savings
can be generated using non—homeothetic utility functions. However, both
empirical evidence and theoretical considerations support the standard proce-
dure of imposing homeotheticity. On balance, there remains reason to believe
that life—cycle saving is very likely to respond positively to after tax rates
of return, but the question is ultimately an empirical one.
Bequest Savings
Recent research [e.g., Kotlikoff and Summers (1981)] suggests that
bequests may account for a large fraction of national capital formation.
The papers by Evans (1983) and Starrett (1982) discussed above argue that
taking account of bequests makes it very plausible that the interest elasticity—6—
of savings is negative. The critical issue is how bequests are modelled.
In Summers (1982), I establish the following results. As long as any part
of the population is saving for altruistic bequests, the long run partial
equilibrium elasticity of savings with respect to the rate of return will be
infinite. Illustrative calculations suggest that it is likely to be very high
in the short run as well. Thus taking account of bequests increases the pre-
dicted elasticity of savings.
Of course alternative formulations of the bequest process are possible,
although it seems hard to entirely rule out altruism. My own favorite is
outlined in Bernheim, Shleifer and Summers (1983). It has implications similar
to the standard life cycle model. Seidman (1983) incorporates bequests into
my (1981) model by assuming that they generate utility directly for donors and
get results qualitatively similar to mine. Evans gets low or negative elastic-
ities only by assuming counterfactually that bequests are typically passed
over a span of two generations, and by employing an ad hoc treatment that
allows for no substitutability between bequests and consumption in donors'
utility functions. He presents no evidence to support either of these assumptions.
The combination of the considerations discussed in this section suggest
that the data should be approached with at least a mild presumption in favor
of the hypothesis that savings respond positively to real after tax rates
of return. There are certainly internally consistent theoretical models which
lead to a different conclusion but their premises do not seem compelling. We
now turn to the empirical evidence.
II. Empirical Evidence
A large number of authors including Wright (1970, 1979), Weber (1970,—7—
1975), Boskin (1978), Howrey and Hymans (1980), and Blinder (1981) have
attempted to estimate the effects of changes in the rate of return on con-
sumption and savings using Keynesian consumption functions. No consensus
has emerged. Only Boskin obtains a statistically significant and substantial
positive interest elasticity of savings. Howrey and Hymans (1980) show that
his results are extremely sensitive to the choice of sample period, and to
issues of data construction. I believe that there are fundamental conceptual
problems which make it almost inconceivable that consumption function estima-
tion can ever answer the questions of interest. Three difficulties seem
paramount.
First, theory, particularly in the case of life cycle savers, suggests
that the value of consumers' endowments is a function of the interest rate.
Increases in the real after tax interest rate reduce the value of human wealth,
and may affect marketable wealth as well. These effects are not captured in
standard formulations. When they are taken account of using a full macro-
economic model as in Nodigliani (1971), or a modified single equation consump-
tion function as in Summers (1982), dramatic positive effects of increases in
rates of return on savings result.
Second, the question of primary interest to persons concerned with tax
policy is the response of savings to permanent changes in the real after tax
rates of return. The experiments provided by history came in the form of
largely transitory changes in after tax rates of return. Both theory and
common sense suggest the response to temporary changes in rates of return
should be much smaller than the response to permanent changes. This creates
a strong presumption that simple extrapolation of the historical experience
will lead to very substantial underestimates of the response of savings to—8—
permanent changes in the rate of return. This presumption is magnified bythe
very high noise—signal ratio in any attempted estimates of the real after
tax rate of return over a long horizon.
Third, there are the standard set of difficulties associated with
any Keynesian consumption function. Almost all the right hand side variables
are probably endogenous. There is no satisfactory way of meeting the Lucas
critique in modelling expected future labor income. No variables are included
which address theoretically relevant issues such as the age structure of the
population, or expected retirement ages. In an important recent study,
Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1981) illustrate the behavior of an economy in which
the life—cycle hypothesis holds exactly, and then fit standard consumption
functions. The results indicate that parameter estimates are extremely
sensitive to the choice of sample period, and that estimated parameters do not
provided a useful guide to the effect of policy interventions.
What then can be done? I have suggested the futility of standard
consumption function estimation for answering questions relating to long run
tax policies. Recent work by Grossman and Shiller (1981), Hensen and Singleton
(1982) and many others suggests an alternative approach. In general, it is
possible to estimate the parameters of the utility function driving consumers'
behavior, even where it is impossible to estimate any kind of structural
consumption function. Essentially identification comes from the requirement
that consumers satisfy certain first order conditions for utility maximization.
This can be done using data on individual consumers as in Runkle (1983)
and Shapiro (1983) or, with aggregation assumptions, on aggregate data.
Allowance can be made for the possibility that some consumers are liquidity
constrained. Once utility functions have been directly estimated, simulation—9—
exercises of the sort performed in my 1981 paper can be used to estimate the
effects of tax reforms. Of course much more complex analyses taking account
of individual diversity, and adding realistic information on wage earnings
profiles should be possible.
At this point, the results of such elaborate simulation exercises
cannot be predicted. However available evidence tends to suggest that savings
are likely to be interest elastic. I find in the more reliable estimates in
my 1982 paper, values of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution which
cluster at the high end of the range Evans and I considered. Similar estimates
are found using micro—data by Shapiro (1983) and by Hansen and Singleton (1982).
Where investigators find low estimates of intertemporal elasticity of substi-
tution, it is usually because of the difficulty in modelling ex—ante rates
of return on corporate stock. It is also noteworthy that if proper allowance
is made for trend growth in the economy, estimated time preference rates are
positive, reinforcing the positive effects of rates of return on savings.
Future research, particularly using micro—data, will help to refine these
conclusions and will enhance considerably our understanding of savings behavior.
III. Policy Implications
The U.S. economy now appears to be plagued by large structural budget
deficits which appear likely to continue for the remainder of the decade un-
less major policy actions are taken. Private savings rates as measured in the
National Income and Product Accounts do not appear to have increased along
with the budget deficits. Indeed, many observers have expressed surprise that
given the tax measures enacted in 1981, and the subsequent run up in real
interest rates, savings rates have not increased sharply. Some go as far— 10—
asto call this a serious blow to supply side economics.
Several observations should help to put this discussion in perspective.
Unless savings are extraordinarily elastic with respect to rates of return,
reductions in taxes will reduce the total supply of savings. Reduced public
savings will not be offset by increases in private savings. The hope of
those who advocated savings incentives was that in the long run the revenue
effects of these measures would be offset by reductions in spending or increases
in other taxes. There is no serious case that permanent public dissavings
to finance incentives is a viable strategy for raising national savings.
Does the stability of the private savings rate over the last several
years constitute evidence against the view that savings respond positively
to rate of return incentives? Probably the sample is too short to permit
conclusive judgments. Many other things happened over the last several years.
For example, if the accrued gains to households on common stock are treated
as part of income, the private savings rate was close to 20 percent over the
last 18 months. At the same time that wealth was rising rapidly, households
were suffering through a severe temporary recession, tending to put further
downward pressure on savings rates. A final factor working to make the
private savings rate appear artificially low in recent years has been the
erosion of inflation, which has led to unmeasured increases in real disposable
income and savings.
These factors lead to the conclusion that the evidence is not in on
the savings aspect of Reagan's economic experiment. One of the few virtues
of the macro—economic turmoil we have suffered in recent years is that it
has increased the power of our econometric experiments by raising the
variance of most exogenous variables. Within a few years we should have made
considerable progress towards resolving the uncertainties discussed in this paper.— 11—
Footnotes
1/ As noted below, "compensated savings effects" are not well defined because
savings are not a commodity. As illustrated in Summers (1981), the effect
of a tax change will depend on the timing of compensation.
2/ The argument here is developed rigorously in Seidman (1983) and Summers (1982).
3/ Evans also repeats without attribution the analysis in my 1978 working
paper suggesting that the short run elasticity with respect to a permanent
change in the rate of return will exceed the long run elasticity. Without
explanation, he calls this implausible and claims that it undercuts the
long run analysis. Evans also speaks of a "general equilibrium" elasticity
which is less than the partial equilibrium elasticity I compute. Figure 1
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point clear.
4/ A survey of this burgeoning literature may be found in Mankiw, Rotemberg,
and Summers (1984). The method of estimation described here is frequently
labelled the Euler equation approach.— 12—
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